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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-000O000-

APPELLANTS BRIEF IN
OPPOSITION TO PETITION
FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

WILLIAM RAY GAGON,
Plaintiff,

Case No. 20777
STATE FARM MUTUAL
AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE
COMPANY,

Priority 13

Defendant/Petitioner.
-000O000—

IDENTITY OF PARTIES
The only interested parties are named in the caption.

PUBLISHED OPINION
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of which Respondent seeks
review is Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company,
73 Utah Adv. Rep. 83,476 P.2d 1194 (1987), reproduced infra at A-2.

PRIOR HISTORY
This civil action was filed on December \21, 1983, in the District
Court in and for Salt Lake County. A jury trial wasl held on May 16 and 17,
1985, during which the Honorable John A Rokicn granted the motion of
Defendant/Respondent for a directed verdict on the "bad faith" issues, thus
limiting any recovery by Plaintiff to the amounts ovjed by the insurer under
the terms of its policy. A copy of the Judgment entered on June 3, 1985, is
reproduced infra at A-9.

Plaintiff/Appellant appealed to this Court and this Court deferred
the matter to the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to its "pour-over"
jurisdiction. Oral argument was held on the 29th day of October, 1987, and
the Court of Appeals entered its decision on December 18,1987.
The Court of Appeals held that the trial judge had erred in
directing a verdict against Plaintiff/Appellant on the "bad faith" issues,
reversed, and remanded the case to the District Court for trial on those
issues. Defendant/Respondent/Petitioner now seeks further review of the
matter by this Court pursuant to a Writ of Certiorari.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
At all relevant times, Appellant William Ray Gagon (hereinafter
"Mr. Gagon") was protected under a policy of automobile insurance that
specifically included so-called "collision" coverage.
R. at 14.)

(Answer, paragraph 1,

That automobile insurance policy was issued by Respondent/

Petitioner State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter
"State Farm"). (Id.)
On September 17, 1983, Mr. Gagon was driving his insured vehicle
along a frontage road adjacent to Interstate 15 by the Great Salt Lake west
of Salt Lake City, Utah. (R. at 281, 282, and 290.) Mr. Gagon was following
behind a pickup truck loaded with assorted junk and scrap. (R. at 283.) A
metal object fell from the pickup (R. at 283) and, although he attempted to
avoid it by swerving, Mr. Gagon's vehicle "straddled" the object, which struck
the underside of the vehicle. (R. at 284). Mr. Gagon immediately pulled to
the right side of the road, stopped his car, and got out to inspect for
2

damage. (R. at 285-286.) He looked under the froht of the vehicle and noted
that the spoiler under the front grill had been broken but could see no oil or
other evidence of damage to the engine. (R. at 283-286.) Mr. Gagon loaded
the broken spoiler into his car, got back in the car, and proceeded on.
(R. at 285-286.)
As he gained speed, Mr. Gagon noted that the engine somewhat
seemed to lack power, as if it had "bad gas." (R. at 287-88.) After he had
proceeded only a short distance, he noted that thel engine was losing power
and making a little unusual noise.

(R. at 288 .)

At this same time he

observed that the oil light was on. (R. at 289.) H^ immediately shut off the
engine and coasted. (Id.) He then attempted to j^ush the car (Id.) until he
realized that this was not possible (R. at 290).

Concerned about being

stranded in what he considered a remote area (R. at 289-90), Mr. Gagon
briefly attempted to restart the engine, but abandoned this effort before the
engine actually started because he heard the motoil make an unusual noise.
(R. at 290.)

He secured the vehicle by replacing! the convertible top and

locking the doors. (R. at 291.) Mr. Gagon then sought assistance and had
the vehicle towed to Steve Harris Imports, wherfe repairs were effected.
(R. at 291,293, and 315.)
Upon inspection, it was discovered that th^ impact had disabled the
oil pump (which is located inside the oil pan) (R. ai 296), thus depriving the
engine of lubrication. As a result of this loss of lubrication, the engine was
severely damaged, necessitating repairs costing $1,517.99. (See, Exhibit 4.)
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Mr. Gagon reported the incident to State Farm (R. at 295 and 434)
and, on September 23, 1983, State Farm sent a damage appraiser to look at
the vehicle (R. at 439). But on September 26, 1983 (R. at 39), the appraiser
prepared a damage estimate only with respect to those parts of the vehicle
that had made direct contact with the object in the road (Le., the spoiler, oil
pan, etc.) (R. at 436), stated in his written notes that coverage would not
exist for the mechanical damage, and so informed the service manager at
Steve Harris Imports (Id.). Thereafter, on October 5, 1983, Mr. Gagon was
interviewed by State Farm's claims department and signed a written statement
prepared by State Farm detailing the circumstances under which the damage
had occurred. State Farm has acknowledged that, at the time the statement
was signed and at the time of the trial, the statement accurately reflected
the events that had transpired. (R. at 448 and 464.)
The claims representative handling the file, Doug Nelson, apparently
felt that coverage could be denied for the mechanical damage to the engine.
(R. at 444.) Accordingly, he went to claims supervisor Leon Maxwell and
recommended that State Farm not pay for any of the mechanical damage.
(Id.)

Mr. Maxwell prepared a "Claims Committee Report" in which he

recommended that State Farm "deny engine damage sustained after initial
collision as mechanical failure-wear & tear."

(R. at 472).

A "claims

committee," composed of various State Farm claims personnel, met on October
12, 1983, and denied the claim based upon the policy's "wear and tear"
exclusion (R. at 473 and 476), instructing Mr. Maxwell to hold the decision
for a week and then notify Mr. Gagon of the denial of his claim (R. at 447).
Prior to this decision, State Farm made no investigation of the incident other
4

than to accept and rely upon the written statement signed by Mr. Gagon.
(R. at 444-45.)

On October 18, 1983, Mr. Maxwell wrote to Mr. Gagon,

informing him that, based upon the "wear and teftr" exclusion, State Farm
would not pay for any of the engine damage and ^hat it would pay only for
the damage to the spoiler and the dented oil pan.
At trial, Mr. Nelson acknowledged th^t State Farm's internal
procedures allowed for Mr. Gagon to submit information or argument in
support of his claim to the claims committee (R. at 475) and claimed that his
letter of October 18, 1983, served to notify Mr. Gagon of this right (Id.). Of
course, at the direction of the claims committee, the letter was, in actuality,
mailed six days after the claims committee's "final decision." (R. at 476.)
At trial, Mr. Nelson testified that there were no set criteria to
determine whether or not State Farm would pay for loss of lubrication
damages under its policy. (R. at 441.) In fact, however, State Farm provides
to its claims personnel, in an effort to help them understand the terms and
provisions of State Farm's automobile policy, a Claims handling manual."
(R. at 446.) Both of the State Farm employees handling Mr. Gagon's claim
admitted, however, that they had not consulted the "claims handling manual"
in connection with this claim. (Id. and R. at 482-^3.) In its discussion of
losses such as Mr. Gagon's, State Farm's own Claims handling manual
specifically states:
Claims for damage to the motor caused by the loss
of oil following a roadbed collision will qualify for
payment under any form of Collision C o v e r a g e . . . .
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This has the effect of treating motor damage
following a roadbed collision as a part of the direct
damage, instead of indirect damage. . . .
Exhibit 9-P.
The only ground ever given by State Farm (before this litigation
was commenced) for its denial of Mr. Gagon's claim for the mechanical
damage to his engine was the policy exclusion of coverage for damage "due to
and limited to wear and tear
18 October 83.)

."

(See, e.g., denial letter of

At trial (R. at 474), however, as well as in an earlier

deposition (Maxwell Depo. at 89), State Farm's claims supervisor, Leon
Maxwell, admitted that he knew Mr. Gagon's engine was damaged because it
was not getting oil and that the lack of oil was caused by the inoperable
condition of the oil pump. He also acknowledged that he knew that the oil
pump had become inoperable because of the impact with the object in the
road and that he knew that the oil pump had not worn out. (R. at 474 and
Maxwell Depo. at 89.) Thus, Mr. Maxwell acknowledged both at trial and in
an earlier deposition that he knew that the damage to Mr. Gagon's engine
was the result of the impact with the object in the road and that the damage
was not the result of an engine component wearing out.
When Mr. Gagon's car had been repaired, he was unable to pay for
the repairs and the dealer refused to release the car until the charges were
paid for in full.

(R. at 315-19.) In the course of conversations with the

dealer, it was suggested to Mr. Gagon that he should consult with an attorney
since State Farm was refusing to pay his claim. (R. at 321-24.) Acting on
this advice, Mr. Gagon consulted with Val Antczak, an attorney with the law
firm of Parsons, Behle & Latimer, who wrote a demand letter to State Farm
6

pointing out that denial based upon the "wear afrd tear" exclusion of the
policy was entirely without merit. (R. at 323-24.) Nevertheless, State Farm
persisted in its denial of the claim. Mr. Antcza^c referred Mr. Gagon to
Appellant's present counsel and this suit ensued. (R. ^it 324.)
It was only after suit was filed that St^te Farm first raised the
question of the reasonableness of Mr. Gagon's conduct

In its Answer, it

alleged that Mr. Gagon had been contributorily negligent. (R. at 16.) In
response to Mr. Gagon's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, State Farm
contended that Mr. Gagon had been negligent and had unreasonably continued
to operate his vehicle once he knew that the lubrication system had been
damaged. However, State Farm still made no investigation of this contention
and admittedly continued to accept Mr. Gagon's statement as being correct.
It was acknowledged at trial (R. at 450) las it had earlier been by
Mr. Maxwell in his deposition (Maxwell Depo. at 69), that it was State Farm's
practice to "compromise" rather than pay in full Claims of its insureds for
engine damage resulting from loss of lubrication. Mr. Maxwell testified at
trial that he knew of no such claim that had beeni paid in full (R. at 458),
although he admitted that the local State Farm office handles one or two
such claims per month (R. at 456). Similarly, Mr. Nelson, who has been with
State Farm for 23 years (R. at 441), testified that tie, personally, had never
paid a loss of lubrication claim (R. at 442). Thtis, despite the fact that
during discovery State Farm had refused to provide information with respect
to its denial of other similar claims, and the trial c^nirt denied Mr. Gagon's
motion to compel State Farm to provide that information (R. at 232-33), there
is substantial and unrefuted evidence of a continuing practice by State Farm
7

to deny the claims of its insureds for engine damage as a result of loss of
lubrication following an impact with an object in the road.
At trial, the court refused to allow any testimony and refused to
admit any evidence relating either to counsel fees as consequential damages
or to the measure of punitive damages. (R. at 409-11.) At the conclusion of
Plaintiffs case, State Farm moved for a directed verdict on the ,fbad faith"
issue. This motion, argued after Defendant had rested, was then granted.
(R. at 539.) While the jury found, of course, that coverage existed for the
internal damage to Mr. Gagon's engine and that Mr. Gagon's conduct had not
contributed to that damage (R. at 234), the jury was, nevertheless, unable to
award any damages beyond the cost of repairing the vehicle. Mr. Gagon was,
therefore, left without any meaningful redress since his costs and counsel
fees far exceeded his recovery.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals, authored by Judge Greenwood
with which Judges Billings and Bench both concurred, while abbreviated, is
entirely consistent with these facts. 746 P.2d at 1194.

ARGUMENT

POINT I: REVIEW BY WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS NOT APPROPRIATE
IN THIS CASE.
The considerations governing the granting of a Writ of Certiorari
by this Court to review a decision of the Utah Court of Appeals are set forth
in Rule 43 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. That rule makes clear
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that a Writ of Certiorari will be granted only Infrequently and in truly
extraordinary cases:
Review by a Writ of Certiorari is hot a matter of
right, but judicial discretion, and will be granted only
when there are special and important reasons therefor.
Rule 43, R.U.S.C. (emphasis added).
This case meets none of the four criteria set forth in the rule
because there is no conflict between panels of thei Court of Appeals; there
can be no contention that the Court of Appeals has "so far departed from the
accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings . . ." as to require review
of its decision; the legal questions decided by tl^e Court of Appeals fall
squarely within the holding of this Court in Beck v. Farmers Insurance
Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985); and, for the $ame reason, there is no
conflict between the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals in this case and
any prior decision of this Court.
There is nothing unusual or extraordinary about this case; it is
simply a case in which a simple insurance claim ^as made and improperly
denied by the carrier. Legally and philosophically, the facts of the case fall
squarely within the principles articulated by this C0urt in Beck. The Court
of Appeals simply applied those principles in determining that the trial judge
in this case had erred when he ruled as a matter of law that no reasonable
mind could have believed the insurance carrier's conduct to have been in
breach of the three-pronged duty set forth in Beck for the carrier to
diligently investigate, fairly evaluate, and promptly handle claims.

In this

case, the facts demonstrate that the carrier failed to fairly evaluate and made
little, if any, investigation of the claim.
9

Accordingly, the fact that the

carrier acted promptly and courteously in denying the claim constituted no
defense to Plaintiffs claims and the Court of Appeals correctly reversed the
trial judge who had ruled to the contrary.
In an effort to bring this case within the extremely narrow
parameters of Rule 43, Defendant/Respondent/Petitioner State Farm attempts
to create artificially a tension or inconsistentcy between the Court of
Appeals' decision in this case as compared with this Court's decision in
Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Marchant, 615 P.2d 423 (Utah 1980),
and the Court of Appeals' decision in Callioux v. Progressive Insurance
Company, 745 P.2d 838 (Utah CtApp. 1987). Both of those cases, however,
stand merely for the proposition that an insurance carrier has a right to
dispute or deny coverage in those cases in which a legitimate, real, and good
faith question exists as to the insured's entitlement to coverage. Mr. Gagon
recognizes and does not dispute this obviously true proposition.

In the

present case, however, Mr. Gagon presented to the trial court a strong
showing that there existed no real question as to his entitlement to coverage.
For example, State Farm's own claims manual said that there was coverage
under these circumstances; State Farm's claims manager testified that he knew
that the engine damage had resulted from loss of lubrication as a result of
the impact and that he knew that the oil pump had not simply worn out; and
State Farm's employees admitted at trial that they never paid claims similar
to Mr. Gagon's. Accordingly, in this case, State Farm denied a claim that it
knew it should have paid and that its own claims handling manual mandated
should be paid. Factually, then, this case is entirely distinguishable from the
Marchant and Callioux cases in which the carrier successfully demonstrated
10

reasonable, legitimate, good faith reasons to doubt coverage.1 Under these
circumstances, this case does not fall within the narrowly defined parameters
under which review by Writ of Certiorari should be granted.
To allow further review in this case ip merely to protract the
litigation process. The Utah Court of Appeals was not intended to create yet
a third step in the litigation process, it was intended to reduce the
insurmountable workload of this Court. To allow rekriew by Writ of Certiorari
in this case would be to wholly defeat that beneficial purpose.

*For example, in Callioux, the insured was changed with arson although
found not guilty at the criminal trial. Similarly, iiji Marchant, there was a
real question as to the identity of the actual employer of the injured
claimant. No such legitimate questions existed in this cfase.
11

POINT II:

THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS IS

CORRECT AND FURTHER REVIEW IS UNNECESSARY.
A review of the opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals indicates the
thoroughness with which the Court reviewed and the care with which the
Court considered this matter. After surveying the applicable facts, the Court
of Appeals noted:
It was undisputed that State Farm denied coverage for
plaintiffs claim because "the damages sustained to the
internal parts of the engine were not a result of a
collision loss but rather a result of a mechanical failure,
wear and tear." However, State Farm's claims manual
states:
MOTOR DAMAGE FROM LOSS
OF OIL:

Claims for damage to the motor
caused by the loss of oil following a
roadbed collision will qualify for
payment under any form of Collision
Coverage.

At trial[,] plaintiff testified that he was in the
wholesale jewelry business and had never worked on cars
other than adding windshield washer fluid, radiator fluid
and oil. He testified that he had stopped his car after
hitting the metal object, looked under the car and did
not see any oil. After inspecting the car, he drove for
another three miles before he noticed a loss of power,
observed that the oil light was on and stopped the car.
In addition, there was conflicting testimony as to
whether the loss of lubrication occurred within seconds
of impact with the metal object or whether plaintiff
caused the damage by continuing to operate the vehicle.
Based on these facts, . . .
we conclude that
reasonable persons could reach different conclusions as
to whether State Farm fairly evaluated the claim and
12

acted reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.
Therefore, we hold that, in light of Bec;k, the directed
verdict on the bad faith issue was improperly granted,
and the issue should have been decided by the jury.
746 P.2d at 1196-97. Given the fact that State Farm's own claims handling
manual mandated that it pay in full the claim that it denied, how could the
Court of Appeals have ruled otherwise?
Not only did State Farm fail to "fairly evaluate" this claim (which
it denied when its own claims manual said it should have been paid), but its
investigation failed to reveal a single fact that coul^i have supported a denial
based upon the wear and tear exclusion. At the time it denied the claim,
State Farm had only Mr. Gagon's statement and it acknowledged at trial that
it had no reason to doubt that statement. That statement contains no fact or
implication that would support a denial of the | claim.

If the duty to

"diligently investigate" is to have any meaning, it mkist mean that the carrier
at least has the duty to investigate to determine Whether there are facts to
support its denial. In this case, State Farm's investigation wholly failed to
offer any support for a denial under the wear and tear exclusion. As its
claims personnel admitted at trial, State Farm knew Jthat the engine had been
damaged because the oil pump was not working and that the oil pump was not
working because of the impact with the object in the road. State Farm knew
that the oil pump had not simply worn out. Under pese circumstances, State
Farm has acknowledged that it knew that there wasl no factual support for a
denial under the wear and tear exclusion.
Not only is the Court of Appeals' decision correct with respect to
the question of "bad faith," it is a correct application of this Court's decision
13

in Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P.2d 795 (Utah 1985), with
respect to the types of damages recoverable by the insured victim of an
insurer's ffbad faith" conduct. On this issue in Beck, this Court noted:
In adopting the contract approach, we are not
ignoring the principal reason for the adoption of the tort
approach — to provide damage exposure in excess of the
policy limits and thus remove any incentive for breaching
the duty of good faith . . . .
701 P.2d at 801 (emphasis added). This Court, perhaps in order to remove
even the possibility of any lingering doubt as to whether damages in excess
of the coverage defined by the policy contract might be recovered by the
insured in a "bad faith" action in Utah, again reiterated:
In an action for breach of a duty to bargain in good
faith, a broad range of recoverable damages is
conceivable, particularly given the unique nature and
purpose of an insurance contract. An insured frequently
faces catastrophic consequences if funds are not available
within a reasonable period of time to cover an insured
loss; damages for losses well in excess of the policy
limits, such as for a home or a business, may therefore
be foreseeable and provable. . . .
Id. at 802 (emphasis added, citation omitted).
In this case, there was evidence before the trial court that State
Farm had refused to pay Mr. Gagon's claim even though its claims manual
mandated such payment; that State Farm knew that there was no factual basis
for application of the "wear and tear" exclusion; and that State Farm had a
long-established pattern of denying such claims.

As recognized by this

Court's decision in Beck, the most important social policy furthered by the
"bad faith" concept (whether based in tort or based in contract) is the
discouragement of the repetition of reprehensible and irresponsible conduct by
insurers.

When the amount of the claim the carrier refuses to pay is
14

relatively large, the insured has reasonable recourse to the courts and to
justice because the size of the claim not only justifies, but actually makes
possible, the retention of legal counsel and the litigation, through trial if
necessary, of the insured's claim. However, where the amount of the claim
that the carrier has refused to pay is relatively small - such as the claim in
this case, which was less than $1,500.00 -- the insured is left, as a practical
matter, with no effective redress or recourse whatsoever. He can complain to
the insurer, who will disregard his protestations; he can complain to the
Insurance Commissioner, who will listen to his complaints and sadly inform
him that, although justified, payment cannot be Compelled; he can seek
attorneys, who will listen to him and tell him that he has a valid claim, but
that he cannot afford their time. It is only through punitive damages that
two important purposes can be furthered.

First, t)ie insured can be made

whole and compensated for his loss and for his courage in pursuing a small
claim that others would have been forced to decide Was "too small" to pursue.
Second, the insurer can be discouraged from attempting to perpetrate against
others such pernicious conduct. The Court of Appe4ls was, therefore, correct
in directing that the question of punitive damages be reached if, on retrial,
State Farm is found to have acted in "bad faith."
Punitive damages are also appropriate in this case because State
Farm's conduct meets the standard articulated by ttiis Court in Behrens v.
Raleigh Hills Hospital, Inc., 675 P.2d 1179 (Utah 198^). Before this Court in
that case was a widow's action for the wrongful de^th of her husband, who
had died when the defendant, an alcoholism treatment center, had given him a
safety razor with which to shave but with which he instead committed
15

suicide. This Court held that punitive damages might be awarded without a
showing of actual malice:
Such damages may . . .
be appropriate to take the
profit out of wrongdoing where compensatory damages
are small in relation to the resources of a defendant and
can be subsumed as a cost of doing business . . .
675 P.2d at 1187. Since the compensatory damages to which Mr. Gagon is
entitled are small (even when his counsel fees are included as an element of
damages), State Farm can easily treat those compensatory and consequential
damages as merely a "cost of doing business."

Accordingly, the Court of

Appeals was correct in its determination that the question of punitive
damages should be reached in the event that the jury, on remand, should find
that State Farm acted in "bad faith."

CONCLUSION
This case falls far short of meeting the very narrowly defined
parameters under which this Court should grant a petition for review of a
decision of the Utah Court of Appeals by Writ of Certiorari. The Court of
Appeals was intended to reduce this Court's insurmountable workload, not to
add a third step to the litigation process. Accordingly, only in infrequent
and truly extraordinary cases should certiorari be granted. The decision of
the Court of Appeals in this case is entirely consistent with the law
announced by this Court in a recent decision squarely on point.
review is not appropriate.

16

Further

Moreover, the decision of the Utah Court of Appeals, in this case,
is correct and appropriate under the facts of the ca^e. Further review is not
appropriate and the petition for Writ of Certiorari mujst be denied.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this ^

day of March, 1988.

PARKEN & llfecK

)rney for Plaintiff/
jllabt

ORIGINAL SIGNATURE

John D. Parken
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that on the \ffi

day of March, 1988, I caused

four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing Appellant's Brief in
Opposition to Petition for Writ of Certiorari to be mailed, postage prepaid, to
Paul M. Belnap, Strong & Hanni, Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent/
Petitioner, Sixth Floor Boston Building, Salt Late City, Utah 84111.

ORIGINAL SIGNATURE
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Opinion of the Utah Court of Appeals
. . . . . . .
Gagon v. State Farm Mutual Insurance Company
Case No. 860137-CA

A-2

Judgment

A-9

A-l

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
OOOOO

William Ray Gagon,
Plaintiff and Appellant,

OPINION
(For Publication)

v.
Case No. 860137-CA
State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Company,
a/k/a State Farm
Insurance Companies,
Defendant and Respondent.

FILED
DEC 181987
Timothy r j. Sh^f;

Before Judges Greenwood, B i l l i n g s and Bench.

utsh court of Apv^s

GREENWOOD, Judge:
Plaintiff, William Ray Gagon, brought this action against
defendant/ State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
(State Farm), for payment of his insurance claim and for
alleged bad faith refusal to pay his claim. Plaintiff appeals
from the trial court's directed verdict against him on the bad
faith issue. We reverse and remand.
On September 17, 1983, plaintiff was driving his 1979
Fiat Spider when a metal object fell out of the back of a
pickup truck he was following and struck the underside of his
car. Plaintiff stopped his car and noted that the plastic
spoiler under the front grill had been broken, but he could see
no oil or other evidence of damage to the car. Plaintiff then
restarted the car and drove about three miles. While driving,
he noticed that the car lacked power and that he was unable to
drive faster than forty-five or fifty miles per hour. Towards
the end of the three miles, he observed that the oil light was
on. He stopped the car, tried to push it and briefly attempted
to restart it. When the car would not start, plaintiff had it
towed to Steve Harris Imports where inspection revealed that
the oil pump was broken. Because the oil pump stopped
functioning, the engine was damaged due to loss of lubrication,
costing $1,517.99 to repair.

a_o

Plaintiff reported the incident to State Farm on September
19, 1983. On September 23, State Farm's appraiser examined the
vehicle and prepared a damage estimate indicating that State Farm
would only cover the external damage to the car and not the
internal damage due to loss of lubrication. On October 5, 1983,
plaintiff went to State Farm's office and signed a statement
explaining the circumstances of the incident. On October 12,
1983, State Farm's claims committee determined that plaintiff's
claim would be denied "for internal repairs to the engine because
of mechanical failure - wear and tear." On October 18, 1983,
State Farm informed plaintiff of its decision to deny coverage for
internal repairs and allow coverage for only the external damage.
In December 1983, plaintiff initiated this action alleging that
State Farm's refusal to pay his claim wa£ in bad faith.
On the first day of trial, the parties stipulated that the
case would be tried on the bad faith isstie, and if the jury found
bad faith, plaintiff could then submit evidence of punitive
damages. On the second day of trial, the court disallowed
plaintiff's evidence of attorney fees with the proviso that he
would reconsider the admissibility of attorney fees if the jury
found bad faith. After the parties had presented their evidence,
both parties moved for a directed verdict. The trial judge
granted State Farm's motion on the issue of whether State Farm
acted in bad faith in refusing to pay plaintiff's insurance claim
and denied plaintiff's motion regarding coverage under the policy
for engine damage. The judge then allowed the jury to determine
whether plaintiff was entitled to all the damages resulting from
the accident. The jury awarded plaintiff $1,517.99, less
plaintiff's insurance deductible of $2004 plus ten percent
interest from September 17, 1983. Plaintiff appeals claiming that
the trial court erred in granting State Farm's motion for a
directed verdict on the bad faith claim since reasonable minds
could have found that State Farm acted in bad faith. Plaintiff
also contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence of
punitive damages and consequential damages including attorney
fees.
I.
In reviewing a directed verdict, the court must examine all
the evidence in the light most favorable to the losing party.
Acculog, Inc. v. Peterson. 692 P.2d 728, 732 (Utah 1984). If the
evidence permits reasonable persons to r$ach different conclusions
on the issues, the directed verdict should not be granted. Little
Am. Ref. Co. v. Levba, 641 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah 1982); Cerritos
Trucking Co. v. Utah Venture No. 1. 645 l(.2d 608, 611 (Utah 1982).
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After the trial court granted State Farm's motion for a
directed verdict on the bad faith issue, the Utah Supreme Court
rendered Beck v. Farmers Insurance Exchange, 701 P. 2d 795 (Utah
1985).* In Beck, the Court held that "as parties to a
contract, the insured and the insurer have parallel obligations
to perform the contract in good faith.- Id. at 801. The Court
then defined the obligation of good faith as contemplating that
H
the insurer will diligently investigate the facts to enable it
to determine whether a claim is valid, will fairly evaluate the
claim, and will thereafter act promptly and reasonably in
rejecting or settling the claim." l£l. In addition, the Court
stated that the duty of good faith -requires the insurer to 'deal
with laymen as laymen and not as experts in the subtleties of law
and underwriting* and to refrain from actions that will injure
the insured's ability to obtain the benefits of the contract."

Id.
With these principles in mind and viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to plaintiff, we examine whether
reasonable minds could differ as to whether State Farm breached
its obligation of good faith. It was undisputed that State Farm
denied coverage for plaintiff's claim because "the damages
sustained to the internal parts of the engine were not a result
of a collision loss but rather a result of a mechanical failure,
wear and tear." However, State Farm's claims manual states:
MOTOR DAMAGE FROM LOSS OF OIL:

Claims for damage to the motor caused
by the loss of oil following a roadbed
collision will qualify for payment under
any form of Collision Coverage.
1. Beck overruled Lyon v. Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co.,
25 Utah 2d 311, 480 P.2d 739 (1971) to the extent that Lvon was
philisophically inconsistent with the Beck Court's recognition of
a cause of action in contract for the insurer's failure to
perform the contract in good faith and noted that Lyon considered
only the question of whether a claim of bad faith gave rise to a
tort cause of action. Beck, 701 P.2d at 798 n.l. The Court
characterized the ruling in Lvon as leaving "an insured without
any effective remedy against an insurer that refuses to bargain
or settle in good faith with the insured." Id. at 798.
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A roadbed collision shall be deemed
to be any contact between the insured
vehicle and the roadbed, or ai^y object
fixed, frozen or imbedded in the road such
as a rock, stump, or any other| stationary
object.
There should be a reasonable
compliance with that conditio^ of the
policy which provides, 'When loss occurs
the named insured shall use every
reasonable means to protect the damaged
property covered by this policy* from any
further damage.•
This has the effect of treating motor
damage following a roadbed collision as a
part of the direct damage, instead of
indirect damage. Reference to the
Conditions Section is made because the
payment should not include any amount for
damage resulting from the further
operation of the vehicle after damage to
the oil pan or to the motor has become
known to the operator, or after the
existence of damage should have become
known by the operator exercising
reasonable care.
At trial plaintiff testified that he Was in the wholesale
jewelry business and had never worked on cars other than adding
windshield washer fluid, radiator fluid and oil. He also
testified that he had stopped his car aftbr hitting the metal
object, looked under the car and did not see any oil. After
inspecting the car, he drove for another three miles before he
noticed a loss of power, observed that the oil light was on and
stopped the car. In addition, there was conflicting testimony
as to whether the loss of lubrication occurred within seconds
of impact with the metal object or whether plaintiff caused the
damage by continuing to operate the vehicle. Plaintiffs
witness, Gary Majnik, who repaired his car, testified that an
engine in a Fiat Spider could be damaged jby loss of lubrication
within seconds of hitting an object. Plaintiff also called
another mechanic, Steve Crane, who testified that a person
without general knowledge of mechanics, wpo hit something on
the underside of a 1979 Fiat and dented the oil pan, would not
know whether to continue driving the car other than as
indicated by the warning systems in the car. He also stated
that the warnings systems can malfunction!.

860137-CA

4

Based on these facts, we find that reasonable minds could
differ as to whether plaintiff, exercising reasonable care,
knew or should have known that the oil pump was damaged and
that he should not continue to drive the car. Further, we
conclude that reasonable persons could reach different
conclusions as to whether State Farm fairly evaluated the claim
and acted reasonably in rejecting or settling the claim.
Therefore, we hold that, in light of Beck, the directed verdict
on the bad faith issue was improperly granted, and the issue
should have been decided by the jury.
II.
The second issue is whether the court improperly excluded
evidence of punitive damages and consequential damages
including attorney fees. Immediately prior to the trial in
this case, the judge stated on the record that the parties and
the court agreed to exclude evidence of punitivss damages unless
and until the jury found that State Farm had acted in bad
faith. No objection was voiced by plaintiff. Therefore, we
find no merit in plaintiff's claim that evidence of punitive
damages was improperly excluded. On the second day of trial,
the court stated that it would exclude evidence of attorney
fees but would reserve the right to later admit evidence of
attorney fees if the jury found bad faith. Generally, attorney
fees are not chargeable to an opposing party unless there is
contractual or statutory liability for them. Espinoza v.
Safeco Title Ins. Co., 598 P.2d 346, 348 (Utah 1979). However,
according to Beck, consequential damages such as attorney fees
may be recoverable in an insurance carrier lack of good faith
case. Beck, 701 P.2d at 801-02. Therefore, we find no error
in the exclusion of attorney fees until after plaintiff
established that State Farm breached its implied obligation of
good faith. If lack of good faith is found on remand,
consideration of punitive damages and consequential damages
will be appropriate.
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Reversed and remanded.

Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge

WE CONCUR:

Judith M. Billings, Judge

Russell W. Bench, Judge
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
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WILLIAM RAY GAGON,
Plaintiff,
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STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE
INSURANCE COMPANY, a/k/a
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This action came on for trial before the Court and a
Jury, the Honorable John A. Rokich, District Judge, presiding,
commencing on May 16, 1985, and concluding May 20, 1985.

After

the evidence was presented, the Court granted Defendant's motion
for a Directed Verdict on Plaintiff's cause of action for bad
faith including Plaintiff's claim for punitive damages and

1

attorney fees. The remaining matter was submitted to the Jury on
special Interrogatories.

The Jury answered both of the following

questions in the negative:
1.

Under the policy of insurance, coverage is excluded

for damages due to and limited to mechancial failure - wear and
tear.

With the exception of the parts broken when the car

impacted the object in the roadway, was the Plaintiff's damage to
the internal components of his engine due to and limited to
mechanical failure - wear and tear, within the meaning of the
insurance policy exclusion?
2.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case, and

as defined in these instructions, did the Plaintiff fail to
protect his vehicle and thereby fail to mitigate his damage?
This issue having been duly tried and the Jury having
duly rendered its special verdict and the parties having
stipulated that the sum of $1,517.99 is a reasonable sum for the
repairs to Plaintiff's automobile, which repairs where at issue
in this action/ less plaintiff's insurance deduction of $200.00.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AJUDGED AND DECREED that
Plaintiff William Ray Gagon recover from the Defendant State Farm
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Mutual Automobile Insurance Company the sum of $1,317.99 in
special damages together with interest thereon at the rate of 10%
per annum from September 17, 1983, (the date of the occurrence of
the act giving rise to the cause of action) to the date of this
judgment and Plaintiff's costs of action.

The total amount of

this judgment shall bear interest at the rate of 12% per annum
from and after the date hereof*
DATED this

*D

*

day of TRTy, l£85.
BY THE COU^T:

>j/n A
Jojfn
A.. Ro^ich
D i s t r i c t J^idge

Attorney for

Defendant
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